Bill Windsor begins issuing court-ordered subpoenas for Facebook, Cyberstalkers, and Other Kooks in Windsor v. Allie Overstreet.
RAMMING SPEED…MAJOR VICTORY FOR BILL WINDSOR IN LAFAYETTE COUNTY COURT IN LEXINGTON MISSOURI:
Judge Dennis Rolf granted my motion, and the Clerk of the Court is now issuing subpoenas for me to take depositions and obtain documents from non-parties in William M. Windsor v. Allie Overstreet and 1,000 John Does. I have been trying to get this for months. Now I’ve got it.
Now the cyberstalkers have really got something to look forward to. Facebook, Google, Yahoo, CraigsList, YouTube, MySpace, LinkedIn, and many others will be having subpoenas winging their way to them. And a whole host of individuals are being subpoenaed. American Mothers Political Party members, Joeys, would-be killers, and others.
William M. Windsor
www.LawlessAmerica.org – blog site
Bill Windsor files a Response to yet another Motion to Dismiss by Allie Overstreet in the case of Windsor v. Overstreet. This is yet another frivolous motion. The law in Missouri is very clear. But I do appreciate the opportunity to educate Judge Rolf on the corruption that I experienced in federal court in Georgia. Honest judges will see exactly what happened there just from this one example of one violation of the rules and the law after another.
This Motion will be heard at 9:00 am on August 1 in Lafayette County Court in Lexingtom Missouri. Case No. 13LF-CV00461. Here is my Response in its entirety:
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
BY DEFENDANT ALLIE L. OVERSTREET
Comes Now, William M. Windsor (“WINDSOR” or “PLAINTIFF”) and files this PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE BY DEFENDANT ALLIE LORAINE YAGER OVERSTREET. PLAINTIFF shows the Court as follows:
On July 15, 2013, DEFENDANT ALLIE LORAINE YAGER OVERSTREET (“OVERSTREET”) filed a MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE.
On April 29, 2013, the Clerk of the Court docketed PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED COMPLAINT.
On May 29, 2013, an attorney acting for OVERSTREET filed an ANSWER TO THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT, as shown on the Court’s Docket.
By filing an ANSWER 30 days after the VERIFIED COMPLAINT was filed but not filing a MOTION TO DISMISS until 78 days after the VERIFIED COMPLAINT was filed,OVERSTREET lost the right to seek a dismissal. “…a motion to dismiss is made before the filing of an answer….” (In re Marriage of Busch, 310 S.W.3d 253 (Mo.App. E.D. 04/27/2010).) Rule 55.27 provides that the filing of a motion to dismiss is to be before filing an answer. (State of Missouri v. Bonacker, 791 S.W.2d 494, (June 20, 1990).) Rule 55.27 says: “a motion making any of these defenses shall be made: (A) Within the time allowed for responding to the opposing party’s pleading….” 30 days was the time allowed, and 78 days was too late.
The PLAINTIFF did forget to send the letter from the federal judge when he sent the VERIFIED COMPLAINT for filing. The PLAINTIFF had set it aside, not knowing how it should be provided, since the Rules were clear about what was to be filed. When the PLAINTIFF realized that he had failed to put it in the envelope that was sent to the Clerk of the Court, he sent it to the Clerk of the Court and served it on each party by mail. OVERSTREET absolutely was sent a copy.
The mistake was discovered when the PLAINTIFF learned that OVERSTREET had been served by the Sheriff. The PLAINTIFF then immediately sent it to the Clerk and to the Defendants. This oversight should not be grounds to dismiss this action at all. It has not affected this matter in any way.
Counsel for OVERSTREET has again presented a lie to this Court in claiming OVERSTREET was not provided with a copy. That is a LIE.
The PLAINTIFF also takes the position that the order from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia is void. Void orders have no effect. In this case, the void order was issued by a judge who did not have jurisdiction. The order is not signed, and it was not stamped and signed by the clerk of the court as required by federal law. The case was illegally removed from the Fulton County Georgia court to the federal court, so the federal court never obtained proper jurisdiction and failed to rule on WINDSOR’s motions in that regard. The case was on appeal, so the judge had lost all jurisdiction on matters such as this. The judge, Judge Thomas W. Thrash (“TWT”), was a defendant in the actions filed by WINDSOR, and he had no authority to serve as judge when WINDSOR filed a proper motion to have a judge from another district assigned the case. It is well-established that a judge may not rule on civil actions that involve him. WINDSOR was denied the right to answer the motion filed by the U.S. Attorney. WINDSOR was denied the right to submit documents into evidence. WINDSOR was denied the ability to testify. And there was absolutely no testimony at the short hearing or by affidavit from any of the Defendants in the civil action that WINDSOR had filed. WINDSOR asked TWT at the start of the short hearing whether he had already written an order deciding the motion before hearing a word from him. TWT got red-faced and refused to answer. At the conclusion of the short hearing, he turned to his left and read the order that he had already written. In anticipation, WINDSOR and several of his courtroom observers went straight to the Clerk’s Office where WINDSOR FILED an appeal. It was date stamped, and there are witnesses as to the time in addition to WINDSOR. The Clerk of the Federal District Court then falsified the docket by failing to show WINDSOR’s appeal filed until after the court order appeared for filing several hours later. And last but not least, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit outrageously did not allow WINDSOR to file his appeal brief. Windsor had sued every federal judge in Georgia for blatant corruption. Those judges were intent on doing whatever it took to stop WINDSOR. In a related matter, WINDSOR presented criminal charges against several of the judges to a Fulton County Georgia Grand Jury. His testimony was split over two days with a weekend in between. When WINDSOR returned to continue his testimony, he was met by three Fulton County Sheriff’s Deputies and the Chief Investigator for the Fulton County District Attorney (one of those WINDSOR was charging), and he was ordered out of the public courthouse and given a criminal trespass warning that he would be arrested if he ever returned. Law enforcement and the courts then failed to do anything to correct this crime that WINDSOR believes has a sentence of 10 years in prison.
TWT’s orders were, and are, void. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that if a court is “without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers.” (Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828).)
Fraud was committed in the removal of the case from the Fulton County Superior Court. This fraud means TWT did not have jurisdiction. TWT committed fraud upon the court as had the U.S. Attorney. This means TWT did not have subject matter jurisdiction. TWT did not follow mandatory statutory procedures. This means this Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. TWT committed unlawful acts. This means TWT did not have subject matter jurisdiction. TWT violated due process. This means TWT did not have subject matter jurisdiction. TWT is part of a criminal racketeering enterprise. This means TWT did not have subject matter jurisdiction. TWT did not comply with the rules, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This means TWT did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
Upon information and belief, TWT did not have a copy of his oath of office in his chambers. This means TWT did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
It is clear and well established law that a judge must first determine whether the judge has jurisdiction before hearing and ruling in any case. TWT failed to do so, and his so-called orders are void. (Adams v. State, No. 1:07-cv-2924-WSD-CCH (N.D.Ga. 03/05/2008).) (See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); see also University of S. Ala. v. The Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[O]nce a federal court determines that it is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.”). (Jean Dean v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, No. 2:10-cv-564-FtM-29SPC (M.D.Fla. 04/21/2011).) (Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1994).)
TWT demonstrated pervasive bias, and he lost jurisdiction when he failed to recuse himself. A study of pro se cases that TWT has handled reveals that TWT has a proven overwhelming bias against pro se plaintiffs. TWT has an “extra-judicial” bias against pro se parties. According to Windsor’s review of every case TWT has handled in his career using www.versuslaw.com, no pro se plaintiff has ever won in TWT’s court; 90% of pro se cases are dismissed, and 10% are defeated at summary judgment; no pro se plaintiff has ever received a jury trial
Failure to follow the mandatory requirements of the law is a further evidence of the appearance of partiality of TWT. This required recusal. “Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judges impartiality. If a judge’s attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified.” (Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994).) Rankin v. Howard (1980) 633 F.2d 844, cert den. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326. When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts face of clearly statutes valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost. “When there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction.” Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872).
TWT has committed treason. Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821).
Amendment V of the U.S. Constitution provides: “No person shall be…deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law….” Article 1of the Georgia Constitution provides: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.” All of these rights have been violated. TWT has improperly foreclosed Windsor’s access to the court. TWT issued an injunction without giving Windsor the opportunity to be heard at a hearing. Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before any governmental deprivation of a property or liberty interest. (Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995).)
Meaningful access to the courts is a Constitutional right that has been denied by TWT, and this alleged order denies significant rights. (See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 & n.12, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2187 & n.12, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002).)
There was no Show Cause order issued to Windsor as required by Eleventh Circuit law. Windsor did not have proper notice. Upon these findings and consistent with Eleventh Circuit law, this Court required Plaintiff to show cause within ten days… why a Martin-Trigona injunction should not be entered. (See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986); Torres v. McCoun, No. 8:08-cv-1605-T-33MSS (M.D.Fla. 09/10/2008); Western Water Management, Inc. v. Brown, 40 F.3d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1994).) [emphasis added.]
Every judge or government attorney takes an oath to support the U.S. Constitution. Whenever any judge violates the Constitution in the course of performing his/her duties, as TWT has, then he has defrauded not only the Plaintiff involved, but has also the government. TWT is paid to support the U.S. Constitution. By not supporting the Constitution, TWT is collecting monies for work not performed.
The orders issued by TWT are invalid. Orders have not been signed, issued under seal, or signed by the Clerk of the Court in violation of 28 U.S.C. 1691. The word “process” at 28 U.S.C. 1691 means a court order. See Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co., 19 F. 252 (C.C. W.D. Wisconsin 1884); Taylor v. U.S., 45 F. 531 (C.C. E.D. Tennessee 1891); U.S. v. Murphy, 82 F. 893 (DCUS Delaware 1897); Leas & McVitty v. Merriman, 132 F. 510 (C.C. W.D. Virginia 1904); U.S. v. Sharrock, 276 F. 30 (DCUS Montana 1921); In re Simon, 297 F. 942, 34 ALR 1404 (2nd Cir. 1924); Scanbe Mfg. Co. v. Tryon, 400 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1968); and Miles v. Gussin, 104 B.R. 553 (Bankruptcy D.C. 1989).
This is a case of the most overt bias imaginable. TWT has made absolutely false statements in his orders and has announced that he has reached a decision in the case without having any facts before him except Windsor’s.
The case was on appeal, and TWT had no jurisdiction to act at all. In the words of defendant Judge William S. Duffey: (“[A] federal district court and a federal court of appeals should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously. The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance–it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”). (Bryant v. Jones, No. 1:04-cv-2462-WSD (N.D.Ga. 01/10/2007).)
Windsor has many orders from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that provide that the civil action had been stayed and hundreds from federal courts everywhere. See Mahone v. Ray, 326 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2003) and hundreds of others.
The PLAINTIFF contends that the alleged order issued by TWT is absolutely void. As a result, the PLAINTIFF was under no obligation to do anything in regard to the alleged order.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays that this Court enter an order denying the MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE BY DEFENDANT ALLIE LORAINE YAGER OVERSTREET; and grant such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
My Response is printed in its entirety below. As I make quite clear, this is a frivolous motion. There is no basis in fact or in law for this. Allie Overstreet and her attorney are the ones that must be sanctioned for their outrageous discovery abuse. And while I am sure Allie Overstreet doesn’t want the world to see her exposed as a liar, libeler, slanderer, defamer, cyberstalker, and criminal, it’s too late.
This matter will be heard by Judge Rolf at 9:00 am on August 1 in Lexington Missouri. This is case 13LF-CV00461.
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND GAG ORDER OF DEFENDANT ALLIE OVERSTREET
Comes Now, William M. Windsor (“Windsor” or “Plaintiff”) and files this PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND GAG ORDER OF DEFENDANT ALLIE OVERSTREET. PLAINTIFF shows the Court as follows:
DEFENDANT ALLIE LORAINE YAGER OVERSTREET (“OVERSTREET”) is a serial liar who, among other things, swore to Judge John Frerking that the PLAINTIFF had published repeatedly that he intended to be a mass murderer or serial killer and that she was one of the intended victims. This was all an outrageous lie and a crime. There was never any such thing published or communicated in any manner, and Judge John Frerking dismissed the complaint after giving OVERSTREET numerous opportunities to produce some evidence. OVERSTREET is a serial liar who has published things about the PLAINTIFF that would be almost impossible to believe…but the PLAINTIFF has the evidence. OVERSTREET has continued her serial lies in so-called discovery responses.
The attorney for OVERSTREET is also a liar and the type of attorney who causes many Americans to hate attorneys. He lies, makes absolutely false statements to this Court, violates the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct on a regular basis, and makes frivolous claims because his client is as guilty as sin.
The attorney for OVERSTREET feigns that Plaintiff’s 92-item Request for Production of Documents was excessive. There was nothing excessive about it. The PLAINTIFF has identified literally hundreds of false and/or defamatory statements by OVERSTREET. The PLAINTIFF is entitled to discovery on each and every lie as well as all the lies and defamatory statements that the PLAINTIFF has not yet discovered. The attorney for OVERSTREET hasn’t complained about any of the requests. He just wants to frivolously pretend it was excessive. It wasn’t. What was wrong was the utterly outrageous response to the requests by OVERSTREET and her unscrupulous attorney.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 56.01(b)(1), “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action…. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” The attorney for OVERSTREET has not claimed that any of the requested documents were not relevant or did not appear to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The attorney for OVERSTREET does not even offer a bogus explanation for why any number of document requests would be excessive.
The attorney for OVERSTREET lied to this Court in his motion claiming OVERSTREET provided proper responses that numbered over 1700 pages. There weren’t 1,700 pages; there were 1,255 pages. But after adjusting for duplicates and other oddities, the net number is 506. After then deducting for documents not produced as maintained in the usual course of business, unreadable documents, there were only three (3) documents that were originals (two legal documents served on her by the PLAINTIFF and one email). And in total, there were only four (4) documents (8 pages) produced that the PLAINTIFF did not originate or had not received prior to this litigation. The PLAINTIFF has filed proof with this Court regarding the number of documents produced, the number of duplicates, and the worthlessness of what was produced.
The attorney for OVERSTREET then objects in his motion to a simple Request for Production of Documents requesting all of OVERSTREET’S computer and electronic equipment owned or used by Defendant for the past three (3) calendar years to be produced for inspection and forensic evaluation. He claimed such a production puts an undue burden, expense, and oppression upon Defendant. That’s ridiculous. OVERSTREET is a serial liar. The only way the PLAINTIFF will get the evidence that he needs is by getting access to everything she is hiding and has deleted. The PLAINTIFF notified the attorney for OVERSTREET that the forensic company can access the data remotely. So there would be little or no burden or expense. The attorney for OVERSTREET not surprisingly said that didn’t matter. You see, in his unscrupulous world, he has to do everything possible to block the PLAINTIFF from seeing the real evidence. The attorney for OVERSTREET is violating the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct as he does these things, but the rules, truth, fairness, and justice seem to just be words used by others.
There is absolutely no question that OVERSTREET has additional information, and the PLAINTIFF has documents that prove it. She even stated that she did in documents that were produced.
PLAINTIFF scheduled the Deposition of OVERSTREET to begin on a Sunday and bring and produce all of the same documents requested in his First Request for Production of Documents because the PLAINTIFF needed to have OVERSTREET go through every document produced and explain what the documents were, how they were dated, where they were stored in the usual course of business, and what they applied to. Essentially none of this had been provided in the joke that was presented as the Response to the First Request for Production of Documents. This timing would have enabled the PLAINTIFF to complete the deposition before the last hearing was held. That would have enabled the PLAINTIFF to advise the Court of what else OVERSTREET needed to be compelled to do. But OVERSTREET was a no-show for the deposition.
The attorney for OVERSTREET outrageously and sleazily asserts that the PLAINTIFF is systematically performing a method of harassment, annoyance, embarrassment, and oppression through this Court by constant discovery. That is complete, utter nonsense by a sleazy attorney and a dishonest client.
The attorney for OVERSTREET has no evidence of anything done for annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, and there is no Rule or case law to provide for any protective order in this situation. The only thing that should be done is to find OVERSTREET and her attorney in contempt and award significant sanctions to Windsor.
The attorney for OVERSTREET has lied to this Court about the details regarding the first scheduled deposition that OVERSTREET failed to appear for. He falsely and maliciously told this Court that the PLAINTIFF requested confidential work product information as to the names of client’s and scheduling conflicts. This is false as the PLAINTIFF stated at the last hearing. The PLAINTIFF asked for the prior engagement by OVERSTREET that made it impossible for her to attend the deposition that she was legally required to attend. The attorney for OVERSTREET failed to provide any explanation whatsoever. The attorney for OVERSTREET claimed he had a hearing that would not make it possible to do the deposition on Monday. The attorney for OVERSTREET failed to provide any explanation whatsoever. There was no work product in such a request. An attorney has an obligation to substantiate any such excuses. He did not provide the name of the court, the judge, or the case number. The PLAINTIFF will be seeking that information when he files a complaint with the Missouri Bar Association against the attorney for OVERSTREET.
The claim of “work product” by the attorney for OVERSTREET is totally bogus for legal reasons as well. There are federal decisions which “seem to stand for the proposition that the work product immunity applies only to documents prepared in direct relation to the case at bar and that documents prepared for one case, though they would be protected in that case, are freely discoverable in a different case.” 8 Wright & Miller, § 2024 at 200. But the “sounder view” appears to be that such documents prepared for one case have the same protection in a second case, at least if the two cases are related. Id ; State ex rel. Friedman v. Provaznik, 668 S.W.2d at 80 — work product applicable to those cases in which preparation is for the same or related cause; Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.Supp. 136, 153 (D.C.Dela. 1977); Midland Inv. Co. v. Van Alystyne, Noel & Co., 59 F.R.D. 134, 138 (D.C.N.Y. 1973); 8 Wright & Miller, § 2024, 1988 Supp. at 98; 4 Moore, § 26.64 at 26-355; Note, The Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83 Col. L. Rev. 412 (1983).
The PLAINTIFF knows the attorney for OVERSTREET is a liar, and he looks forward to documenting it. At the last hearing, the attorney for OVERSTREET claimed to this Court that he had agreed to answer the interrogatories. That is a complete total lie. So, Mr. Attorney for OVERSTREET, where’s the proof? The PLAINTIFF had never spoken with the attorney for OVERSTREET about the interrogatories, so he would have to have an email, fax, or letter. He doesn’t because he lied.
Faced with any request to limit or interfere with discovery, the court “must also balance the need of the interrogator to obtain the information against the respondent’s burden of furnishing it….” (Edwards v. Mo. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs , 85 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Mo. App. 2002).) The PLAINTIFF has every right to prove all the lies and defamation by OVERSTREET and her co-conspirators. That’s what this case is all about – the unbelievable dishonesty of OVERSTREET. The attorney for OVERSTREET has failed to present any argument whatsoever for why the PLAINTIFF should be interfered with in his simple effort to obtain the discovery that he has a legal right to obtain. This Court would abuse its discretion by limiting the PLAINTIFF in any manner because it would be clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and would be so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.” (Edwards , 85 S.W.3d at 23 (citing Redfield v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. , 42 S.W.3d 703, 711 (Mo. App. 2001).)
The PLAINTIFF has a substantial need of all of the information that he has requested in discovery, and he is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by any other means.
The PLAINTIFF does have a website about OVERSTREET, just as the PLAINTIFF has other websites about serial liars and criminals. The PLAINTIFF has web sites that discuss the films that he is producing. The PLAINTIFF is a journalist and has been since high school. The PLAINTIFF is also a filmmaker who is currently producing two documentary films and a pilot for a proposed TV series, and OVERSTREET will be featured in each of these video productions.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution says: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ..” While originally applicable only to the federal government, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects freedom of speech and the press against abridgement by state action. (Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).) (See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).) The Constitution of Missouri specifically protects freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. The Press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which provides a method of information and expression. (Lovell c. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).) News media has been recognized by the courts as individuals engaged in the practice of compiling information for dissemination to the public.
The attorney for OVERSTREET requests the Court issue a Gag Order on Plaintiff for any and all communication involved in the instant action not be allowed to be placed on the internet or any other communications between Plaintiff any other person not a party to this action or representing a party to this action. This would be an unprecedented violation of Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press. The motion is utterly frivolous, and OVERSTREET and her attorney should be sanctioned.
At the last hearing, the attorney for OVERSTREET said he would brief case law regarding a gag order. He failed to do so. The PLAINTIFF researched the term “gag” using the Versuslaw service. 41 cases were returned. 40 of them were about people who were gagged with items stuck in their mouths, and one included the term “gag order,” but did not address it.
There are, however, many cases that discuss freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the First Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment proscribed the various states from abridging freedom of speech and press as mandated by the First Amendment. Missouri has a strong freedom of speech clause in the Missouri Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8. It provides: “That no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech, no matter by what means communicated: that every person shall be free to say, write or publish, or otherwise communicate whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuses of that liberty . . . ” Unlike, OVERSTREET, the PLAINTIFF only prints the truth. If he expresses an opinion, it is an opinion. Unlike OVERSTREET, the PLAINTIFF has not violated any laws, so he has not abused the liberty. Even if the PLAINTIFF did anything wrong, OVERSTREET has a remedy – file a lawsuit.
The underlying philosophy of the broad latitude attached to the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press found eloquent expression in the words of John Marshall, which were quoted with approval by James Madison, 6 Writings of James Madison 1790-1802, p. 336 (G. Hunt ed. 1906): “‘Among those principles deemed sacred in America, among those sacred rights considered as forming the bulwark of their liberty, which the Government contemplates with awful reverence and would approach only with the most cautious circumspection, there is no one of which the importance is more deeply impressed on the public mind than the liberty of the press. That this liberty is often carried to excess; that it has sometimes degenerated into licentiousness , is seen and lamented, but the remedy has not yet been discovered. Perhaps it is an evil inseparable from the good with which it is allied; perhaps it is a shoot which cannot be stripped from the stalk without wounding vitally the plant from which it is torn. However desirable those measures might be which might correct without enslaving the press, they have never yet been devised in America .'” (Emphasis in original.)
Chief Justice Hughes in DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365, 57 S. Ct. 255, 260 (1937) tersely stated the underlying philosophy inherent in the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and press in the following words: “(Imperative) is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political Discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.”
The news media itself bears the greater responsibility, even more than the courts, to preserve the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and press. Self discipline on the part of the news media, and it alone, can give purity of meaning to the First Amendment and justification for its literal interpretation and application. (Elmer E. Whitmore v. Kansas City Star, 499 S.W.2d 45, 07/23/73.) The courts have no business interfering with freedom of speech or freedom of the press in civil litigation such as this.
This Court ORDERED OVERSTREET to respond to interrogatories and properly produce documents. OVERSTREET’S attorney was directed by the Court to schedule a deposition at the Plaintiff’s convenience. Holding the deposition over two days was discussed. OVERSTREET’s attorney now refuses to schedule the deposition claiming two days is unreasonable. Based upon the incredible number of lies, outrageous discovery abuse, and uncertainty, no one can predict how long the deposition will take. As the Plaintiff said at the last hearing, it could take a day just to have OVERSTREET identify documents that were not identified in response to request for production of documents. The PLAINTIFF must file yet another motion to compel and for sanctions.
OVERSTREET did respond to interrogatories, but the responses are essentially worthless. The PLAINTIFF must file yet another motion to compel and for sanctions.
The PLAINTIFF has not yet had an opportunity to review the documents produced electronically, but he anticipates that this, too, will require another motion to compel and for sanctions.
OVERSTREET and her attorney have made a mockery of the discovery process. They have no basis for any relief against the PLAINTIFF, and when it comes to unclean hands, not even Lava will clean up their hands. Missouri employs the rule “that equity will not aid a party who comes into court with unclean hands.” (Hardesty v. Mr. Cribbins’s Old House, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Mo.App. 1984).) See also Moore v. Carter, 356 Mo. 351, 201 S.W.2d 923, 929 (Mo. 1947); Swisher v. Swisher, 124 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Mo. App. 2003); Mahaffy v. City of Woodson Terrace, 609 S.W.2d 233, 238 (Mo.App. 1980). “…one who has engaged in inequitable activity regarding the very matter for which he seeks relief will find his action barred by his own misconduct.” (Mahaffy, supra, at 238.) A litigant with unclean hands generally is not entitled to equitable relief such as an injunction or declaratory judgment. (City of St. Joseph v. Lake Contrary Sewer Dist., 251 S.W.3d 362, 369 (Mo. App. 2008).) This rule reflects that the law strives to prevent opportunistic behavior. See id. “A party who participates in inequitable activity regarding the very issue for which it seeks relief will be barred by its own misconduct from receiving relief.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). (Purcell v. Cape Girardeau County Commission, No. SC90383 (Mo. 04/06/2010).)
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays that this Court deny the MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND GAG ORDER OF DEFENDANT ALLIE OVERSTREET; sanction OVERSTREET and her attorney for filing a frivolous motion and repeatedly abusing discovery; and grant such other relief to the PLAINTIFF as the Court deems appropriate.
Bill Windsor files four sworn affidavits under penalty of perjury in Windsor v. Allie Overstreet and Mark Supanich.
I filed four sworn affidavits today with extensive evidence in the case. I have sworn that everything I have said is true and correct.
Neither Allie Overstreet nor Mark Supanich have filed ANY affidavits, nor did they respond to requests for interrogatories, and Allie Overstreet was a no-show for her deposition, so the only evidence and testimony before the Court is mine — all sworn.
Bill Windsor files Motion for Dismissal without Prejudice of Brenda Williamson.
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE OF BRENDA WILLIAMSON AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NOTICE OF AMENDED PLEADINGS
Comes Now, William M. Windsor (“Windsor” or “Plaintiff”) and files this MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE OF BRENDA WILLIAMSON AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NOTICE OF AMENDED PLEADINGS. PLAINTIFF shows the Court as follows:
1. The pro se PLAINTIFF has researched Missouri law to the best of his ability and has been unable to find a case to indicate if the PLAINTIFF’S proposed Amended Pleadings filed on July 2, 2013 is sufficient to remove Brenda Williamson as a party. Therefore, the PLAINTIFF files this alternative motion in hopes that one or the other will be sufficient to effect this change.
2. PLAINTIFF has been unable to locate DEFENDANT BRENDA WILLIAMSON. The address that she gave the PLAINTIFF is invalid. She has refused to provide her address upon request. Online searches have revealed numerous addresses, but none of them seem to be valid. A skip trace service is yet to determine what her current address is.
The PLAINTIFF’s position in 13LF-CV00461 is being jeopardized because the Clerk of the Court will not issue subpoenas required for discovery by claiming that non-party subpoenas will not be issued until all parties have been served.
Therefore, the PLAINTIFF feels that he has no option but to dismiss DEFENDANT BRENDA WILLIAMSON without prejudice so he may add her as a party in the future when she is located.
The PLAINTIFF will continue to attempt to identify her address, and he will seek to have her added as a party at a later date.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays that this Court enter an order granting this MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE OF BRENDA WILLIAMSON AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NOTICE OF AMENDED PLEADINGS; dismiss Brenda Williamson as a Defendant without prejudice so the PLAINTIFF may add her as a party once she is located; and grant such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
Comes Now, William M. Windsor (“Windsor” or “Plaintiff”) and files this NOTICE OF AMENDED PLEADINGS. PLAINTIFF shows the Court as follows:
1. PLAINTIFF has been unable to locate DEFENDANT BRENDA WILLIAMSON. The address that she gave the PLAINTIFF is invalid. She has refused to provide her address upon request. Online searches have revealed numerous addresses, but none of them seem to be valid. A skip trace service is yet to determine what her current address is.
The PLAINTIFF’s position in 13LF-CV00461 is being jeopardized because the Clerk of the Court will not issue subpoenas required for discovery by claiming that non-party subpoenas will not be issued until all parties have been served.
Therefore, the PLAINTIFF feels that he has no option but to amend his pleadings to remove DEFENDANT BRENDA WILLIAMSON.
The PLAINTIFF will continue to attempt to identify her address, and he will seek to have her added as a party at a later date.
Supreme Court Rule 55.33 provides that “A pleading may be amended once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served….”
DEFENDANT BRENDA WILLIAMSON has not filed a responsive pleading, so this Notice of Amended Pleadings does not require a motion or approval of the Court.
PLAINTIFF has effected this removal by amending pages 1, 3, and 13. These amended pages are attached hereto as Exhibit A. All other pages remain the same.